THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM.'
The short period of the present century has witnessed in this
country many legislative and judicial changes in the law. Principles and theories long regarded as sacro-sanct have been repudiated or disregarded, and new ones have been adopted in their
places. So pronounced are these changes that their significance
and their connection with each other and with other sciences
become subjects of pertinent inquiry. An enumeration of some
of the recent changes may perhaps furnish a basis for an answer
to such an inquiry.
Court procedure is being rapidly simplified and robbed of
much of its formalism both by direct legislative enactment and
by delegating to courts the power to make rules of procedure.
Massachusetts has a statute providing for simple forms of indictments in place of the highly technical requirements of the common law. 2 Under this statute an indictment for larceny, for
instance, is sufficient which alleges that A. B. did steal the coat of
C. D. of the value of five dollars. England has just passed a
similar statute,3 and proposals of the same character are being
urged in some of our states. 4 An example of simplified procedure is found in the act creating the new Municipal Court of
Philadelphia, where it is provided that: "All civil actions in said
municipal court shall be begun by filing a statement of the plaintiff's claim, without the issuance of any formal writ. The said
statement shall consist of a concise recital of the facts which
the plaintiff claims give rise to his cause of action." 1 The new
equity rules of the United States Supreme Court have greatly.
modified equity pleading, one of the rules being: "Unless otherwise prescribed by statute or these rules, the technical forms of
'This paper is an elaboration of a public lecture delivered at the University of Pennsylvania.
'Rev. Laws, Igo2, Ch. 218, Secs. 15-45.
a53 L. R. Stat. Ch. go.
'See report of special committee on criminal procedure of the American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 5 Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminology, 827, March, 1915.
'Laws of Pa. 1913, No. 399, Sec. 12.
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pleadings in equity are abolished." 6 It is provided in the equity
rules of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that: "Every bill
shall be expressed in as brief and succinct terms as it reasonably
can be." 7 This rule is more simple than the former requirement
as to the proper degree of certainty necessary for a bill in equity,
the obscurity of which requirement and the respect with which
it was regarded are well illustrated by the statement of a distinguished English judge:
"Certainty in pleading has been stated by Lord Coke to be of
three sorts, viz., certainty to a common intent, to a certain intent in
general, and to a certain intent in every particular. I remember to
have heard Mr. Justice Aston treat these distinctions as a jargon
of words, without meaning. They have however long been made,
and ought not altogether to be departed from." 8
The long recognized theory of legal liability that there shall
be no responsibility without fault has been superseded by the
enactment of workmen's compensation laws which provide that
the employer shall compensate workmen for injuries received
in the course of their employment in the absence of any fault or
wrongdoing on his part. The enactment of these laws indicates
a recognition by society that injuries are necessary accompaniments of industry, and that it is better for society that incapacitated workmen be provided for directly than through the
indirect medium of charity.' In a similar way statutes compelling the establishment of safety and comfort devices for employees
and fixing the hours of labor in certain employments indicate an
effort to better the condition of society by protecting the health of
a large group of its members. The statutes so far enumerated are
commonly described by the general term, social legislation.
'Rule 18.
'Rule i5.
"Buller, J., in Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Bla. 527, 530.
'The arguments in favor of a compulsory workmen's compensation law
were summed up as follows by Mr. Justice Pitney, in New York Cent. R. Co.
v. White, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, 25o (1917) : "In support of the legislation, it
is said that the whole common-law doctrine of employer's liability for negligence, with its defenses of contributory negligence, fellow-servant's negligence, and assumption of risk, is based upon fictions, and is inapplicable to
modem conditions of employment; that in the highly organized and hazardous
industries of the present day the causes of accident are often so obscure and

766

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

So far as laws relative to business are concerned the principle of laissez faire is giving way to that of regulation. Statutes limiting business activity, and forbidding methods and means
formerly perfectly lawful have been recently enacted with great
frequency by the Federal Congress and the state legislatures.
The Sherman Act,1 ° the Hepburn Act, 1 ' the Child Labor Act, 2
the Clayton Act,1" the Pure Food Act, 14 indicate the trend of
federal legislation; and statutes regulating insurance companies,
advertisements and moving-picture theaters are'examples of the
type of laws which the state legislatures are now enacting. In
all these instances private activity is being regulated in the public
interest.
Courts have recently been as active as legislatures in changing the complexion of the law. Criminal procedure has proved
a particularly fertile field, probably because it had attained the
highest degree of artificiality. The principle that where an error
has been committed in the trial of a case it will be presumed that
the defendant was prejudiced is fast being overthrown. An
error in the complaint, a failure to arraign th6 prisoner, the
admission of improper evidence, improper remarks by judge or
counsel, erroneous instructions to the jury, which were formerly
sufficient grounds in themselves for reversing a judgment of
conviction, are now frequently held to be such only when actual
prejudice to the accused can be shown. The present situation in
this regard is well described by a judge of the Supreme Court of
complex that in a material proportion of cases it is impossible by any method
correctly to ascertain the facts necessary to form an accurate judgment, and
in a still larger proportion the expense and delay required for such ascertainment amount in effect to a defeat of justice; that, under the present system, the injured workman is left to bear the greater part of industrial accident loss, which, because of his limited income, he is unable to sustain, so
that he and those dependent upon him are overcome by poverty and frequently
become a burden upon public or private charity; and that litigation is unduly
costly and tedious, encouraging corrupt practices and arousing antagonisms
between employers and employees."
IOU. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, Vol. 4, 4010.
flU. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, Vol. 4, 3812.
U. S. Stat. 915-i6, Part i, 675.
U. S. Stat. at Large 1913-15, Vol. 38, 730.
"U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, Vol. 4, 3956.
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Missouri in a late case. 15 He said: "The time has passed, not
only in this state but elsewhere, when pure technicalities, in the
absence of evidence of well defined injury to the accused, will
be permitted to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal law."
A very important case in this connection is Garland v. State of
Washington, 6 1914, in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a failure to arraign the defendant, in the absence
of evidence that he was prejudiced thereby, did not amount to a
violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Federal Constitution. The court directly overruled the case of Crain v.
U. S.,' 7 decided in 1896. In the Crain case the court said: "The
present defendant may be guilty, and may deserve the full punishment imposed upon him by the sentence of the trial court. But it
were better that he should escape altogether than that the court
should sustain a judgment of conviction of an infamous crime
where the record does not clearly show that there was a valid
trial." 's Referring to the Crain case the court in the Garland
case said: "Technical objections of this character were undoubtedly given much more weight formerly than they are now." "'
It is a familiar theory of the law that a corporation is a personality separate and distinct from the individuals who manage
it and own the stock. As this theory has been regarded as a basic
principle, a large portion of our corporation law has developed
from it. Lately courts have displayed a marked willingness to
depart from this conception of a corporation when in their opinion its recognition will produce injustice in the particular situation. When the fiction of a separate personality is employed to
defeat creditors, to evade an obligation, to protect fraud, to circumvent a statute, to achieve a monopoly or defeat public convenience, it will now be disregarded. 20 A recent writer makes the
following pertinent observation:
" Walker, J., in State v. Flannery, 263 MO.579, 588.
232 U. S. 642.
' x62 U. S. 625.
"P. 645.
" P. 646.
" See U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (9o5).
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"There could be no better refutation of the charge so frequently made horis novissimis that courts are inelastic, unyielding
and unwilling to respond to social and economic facts than the adjustment-still in process--of corporate concepts to modem business facts." 21
In determining the value of the property of a public service
company for the purpose of computing the proper rate of return,
we have been accustomed to hear definite tests laid down, such as
"the amount of the original investment," "the cost of reproduction," and "the cost of reproduction less depreciation." In the
Minnesota Rate Cases decided in 1912 the Supreme Court of
the United States said:
"The ascertainment of that value is not controlled by artificial
rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all rele-

vant facts."

22

One of the most fundamental doctrines of the common law
is that of stare decisis, which has been frequently applied even in
cases where real injustice resulted. "Hard rases make bad law"
is a familiar maxim. Lately a change in the attitude of courts
toward precedents is clearly discernible. Their opinions are devoted more to a discussion of the merits of the case and less to a
citation of cases. Now and then a vigorous protest against the
unreasonable following of precedents is made; for instance,
the following picturesque utterance by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma:
"We must confess to want of respect for precedents which
were found in the rubbish of Noah's Ark, and which have outlived
their usefulness, if they ever had any. When the reason for a rule
of law ceases, the rule should cease also. If this be revolution,
then we are and will continue to be revolutionary." 23
In Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267, 273 (1908), Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "Philosophy may have gained by the attempts in recent
years to look through the fiction to the fact and to generalize corporations,
partnerships and other groups into a single conception." In Continental Tyre
Co. v. Daimler Co., i K. B. 893, 903 (I915), Lord Chief Justice Reading said
in this connection: "It is undoubtedly the policy of the law as administered in
our courts of justice to regard substance and to disregard form. Justice
should not be hindered by mere technicality."
n I. M. Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Col. L. Rev.
496, 518.
230 U. S. 352, 434.

Caples v. State, 3 Old. Crim. Cas. 72, 86.
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The attitude of courts of last resort towards regulative and
social legislation has lately been undergoing a remarkable change.
The emphasis formerly placed on "private property" and "freedom of contract" is now being transferred to the "public interest." Two recent cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court indicate the extent to which private property may now be
regulated for the public interest. In German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Kansas,24 decided in 1914, this court upheld a Kansas
statute that fixed the rate of premium for fire insurance. It was
strongly urged by counsel that the statute was an invasion of
the rights of private property, and Mr. Justice Lamar in his
dissenting opinion forcibly portrayed the effect of such legislation as follows:
"There seems no escape from the conclusion that the asserted
power to fix the price to be paid by one private person to another
private person or private corporation for a private contract of indemnity, or for his product or his labor, or for his private contracts of any sort, will become the center of a circle of price-making legislation that, in its application, will destroy the right of
private property and break down the barriers which the Constitution has thrown around the citizen to protect him in his right of
property-which includes his right of contract to make property,
his right to fix the price at which his property shall be used by
another." 25

The court answered the arguments against the constitutionality of the statute with the simple statement: "To the contention that the business is private we have opposed the conception
of the public interest." 26
During the same year that the Kansas insurance case was
decided, the question of taking property without due process of
law arose in the Pipe Line Cases.2 7 The Supreme Court here
upheld the provision of the Hepburn Act, making those engaged
in piping oil from one state to another common carriers within
the provisions of the act, although the oil so piped was owned by
the pipe lines, and although no public profession had been made
by them. Mr. Justice McKenna vigorously dissented, portray"233 U- S. 389.

'P. 430.

P- 414.

2?234

U. S. 548.
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the insurance case, the extent to
ing, as did Mr. Justice Lamar in.
which the doctrine might be logically carried, and concluded by
asking despairingly: "Under it what attribute of private property is left ?" 28 It may be safely answered that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court private property is
subject to legislative regulation when the public interest, demands it.
The workmen's compensation acts have required a consideration by the courts of the right to take private property and
of freedom to contract.. The conservative and radical views
regarding these problems are respectively illustrated by Ives. v.
South Buffalo Railway Company,2 9 decided by the Court of
Appeals of New York in 19 I, and New York Central Railroad
Company v. White,30 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in March of the present year. In each case the question involved
was the constitutionality of a compulsory workmen's compensation
act, and it is stated by the court in each case that such acts are
radical departures from common law standards. The New York
court unanimously declared the statute in the Ives case unconstitutional, chiefly on the ground that it took private property without due process of law, the court saying: "If such economic and
sociologic arguments as are here advanced in support of this
statute can be allowed to subvert the fundamental idea of property, then there is no private right entirely safe." 81 In the
White case the statute was held constitutional. With reference
to the taking of private property, the court said: "The close
relation of the rules governing responsibility as between employer
and employee to the fundamental rights of liberty and property
is, of course, recognized. But those rules, as guides of conduct,
are not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest."
As regards the violation by the statute of freedom to contract,
the language of the court is equally significant:
"It is said the statute strikes at the fundamentals of constitu"P.

572.

N. Y. 271.
,037 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247.
21P. 295.
2201
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tional freedom of contract . . . We recognize that the legislation under review does measurably limit the freedom of employer
and employee to agree respecting the terms of employment, and
that it cannot be supported except on the ground that it is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. In our opinion it
is fairly supportable upon that ground. And for this reason: The
subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter of compensation for human life or limb lost
or disability incurred in the course of hazardous employment, and
the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the common wel-

fare."

82

In the consideration of statutes limiting the hours of labor
in specified employments, the theory of freedom of contract is
yielding to the demand of the public interest. The reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon,3 1908,
as compared with that of Lochner v. New York,"4 in 1905, shows
a decided change of attitude on the part of the court, even though
the principle of the earlier case is recognized. In the Lochner
case the emphasis was placed on a theoretical freedom to contract; in the Muller case the court was chiefly concerned with the
question whether the statute was justified from the point of view
of the practical situation which it covered. Professor Frankfurter, of Harvard, in an able article in which he analyzes the
judicial opinions relative to hours of labor statutes, states that
the legislation which was upheld by the courts before 19o8 "was
sustained as part of the prevailing philosophy of individualism,
as an exceptional protection to certain individuals as such, and
not as a recognition of a general social interest." 35 In contrast
with this he says that in the decisions since 19o8, "the emphasis
is shifted to community interests."
Perhaps the most significant statement regarding the relation of private rights to the public interest is that of Chief Justice
White in Wilson v. New, 8 1917, the case in which the Adamson
P. 254.
208 U. S. 412.
198 U. S. 45.
'Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law,
353, 363.
so37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298.

29

Harv. L. Rev.
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Act was declared to be constitutional. After setting forth the
right of Congress to regulate the carrier engaged in interstate
commerce the chief justice said:
"Whatever would be the right of an employee engaged in a
private business to demand such wages as he desires, to leave the
employment if he does not get them, and, by concert of action, to
agree with others to leave upon the same condition, such rights are
necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in
a business charged with a public interest and as to which the
power to regulate commerce possessed by Congress applied." 37
To answer the question, suggested when beginning the discussion of the present legal situation, as to the significance of the
changes which are now taking place, it would seem safe to say
that they strongly indicate a well defined movement, the trend
of which is away from reverence for fixed principles towards
consideration of the economic, industrial and social merits of the
particular controversy, away from artificiality towards simplicity,
and from an individualistic towards a collectivistic attitude.
Jurisprudence is now undergoing an evolution similar to
that of the law. In place of the analytical, historical and philosophical systems of jurisprudence which had their vogue in the
last century, sociological jurisprudence is now being developed, the
chief exponent of which in this country is Professor Pound, of
Harvard. He points out that the older schools of jurisprudence
are chiefly concerned with the pursuit of principles, in which
pursuit he says:
it
there is a tendency to forget that law is a practical matter. The desire for formal perfection seizes upon jurists.
Justice in concrete cases ceases to be their aim. Instead, they aim
at thorough development of the logical content of established principles through rigid deduction, seeking thereby a certainty which
shall permit judicial decision to be predicted in detail with absolute
assurance." 38
Under this view of jurisprudence the administration of the
law consists of the logical application of abstract principles of
" P. 303.

65 U.

See T. R. Powell, The Supreme Court and the Adamson Law,

L. REV. 607.
Roscoe Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24
Harv. L. Rev. 591, 596.
PA.
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law to concrete facts. The two necessary qualities for a judge
are considered to be a knowledge of rules and principles and a
logical mind. The conditions underlying the facts before him
are no concern of his. Our courts of last resort are constituted
on this principle, the effect of which is most noticeable in those
of our states which contain large cities. Although a large percentage of the cases argued before the court arise in the great
cities and are the result of conditions there, it is not regarded as
essential that the judges should be at all familiar with such
conditions.
The same attitude is often manifested with regard to legislation. Laws are enacted, based on a theory, without regard to
their fitness to meet the actual situation and even without any
consideration of the question whether they can or will be enforced. Thus the statutes providing for the sterilization of imbeciles and criminals are the direct result of the theory that imbecility and criminality are inheritable. This theory, so far at least
as it applies to criminality, is now discredited and the laws are
not enforced. The laws against prostitution, fornication and contraception were enacted to vindicate an abstract standard of
morality, the legislators failing or even refusing to determine
whether or not public sentiment will permit the enforcement of
such laws, and if not, what will be the results of such non-enforcement. so
The sociological jurists are more concerned with the purposes of law and with its results than they are with the working
out or vindication of fixed principles. 40 Professor Pound thus
compares the attitude of these jurists with that of jurists of the
other schools:
"See article by Howard S. Gans, Some Consequences of Unenforceable
Legislation, i Proceed. Acad. of Polit. Science, 563.
4"Professor W. M. Geldart, of Oxford, in his introduction to the English
translation of von Ihering's Law as a Means to an End, says of the author:
"His repudiation of a 'jurisprudence of concepts' and of the 'written reason'
of the Roman Law as the last word in legal and legislative theory led him
to respect the individualism of the early and middle nineteenth century, and
the stress which he laid on social utility gave an impulse and a justification
to the 'collectivism' (to use the word in the wide sense with which Professor
Dicey has used it), which has been the most characteristic tendency of our
own time and the force of which is not yet spent."
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They look more to the working of the law than to its
abstract content. 2. They regard law as a social institution which
may be improved by intelligent human effort, and hold it their
duty to discover the -best means of furthering and directing such
effort. 3. They lay stress upon the social purposes which law subserves rather than upon sanction. 4. They urge that legal precepts
are to be regarded more as guides to results which are socially just
and less as inflexible molds." 41
"i.

The method of the sociological jurists is largely pragmatic
and it has been suggested that the American philosophy of law
42
will be pragmatism.
The effect of the new juristic thought is already being seen
in this country. Public commissions have been appointed in
some states to study and report upon conditions in advance of
legislation. Courts in certain instances have decided cases on
their economic merits, even though an abstract legal theory was
contravened. The most notable of these cases is Muller v. State
of Oregon,43 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held constitutional the Oregon statute limiting the hours of labor
for women. Such a statute was apparently a violation of the
principle of freedom of contract as defined in former cases, but
the court based its decision upon the physical structure and social
condition of women.4 4 It is now impressively argued that courts
of last resort should take into consideration the social and economic conditions underlying the cases that come before them
and should not base their decisions entirely upon abstract rules.
The new type of juristic thought may well be described as pragmatic and sociological.
After noting the innovations and tendencies which now
characterize law and jurisprudence, the question naturally sug" Roscoe Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 516.
' R. L. Fowler, The New Philosophies of Law, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 718,
73i; Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprdence, 8 Col. L. Rev. 6o5.
In this
connection Professor Pound said: "Law must be valued by the extent to
which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation." Ibid. 605.
43 208 U. S.412.
"See discussion of this case by Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and
the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495.
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gests itself: Are they isolated phenomena or do they constitute
part of a general movement? In the history of former periods,
notably the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, it may be noted
how closely the development of the law and of legal thought were
connected with and how greatly they were affected by the changes
in other fields of learning and activity. In a similar way modern
legal doctrines have resulted from the pressure of economic and
philosophical theories. It also has been pointed out in this paper
that courts are now being influenced by conditions outside the
sphere of law. These facts justify an investigation of other departments of scientific thought, for the purpose of comparing
them with the present state of law and jurisprudence. This will
now be attempted, beginning with philosophy.
Rationalism, with its enthronement of human reason as the
final criterion and chief source of knowledge, and idealism, with
its teaching that knowledge is a source of being, were the prevailing types of philosophy in the nineteenth century. Closely
associated with these were metaphysics, with its search after first
principles, and absolutism, the doctrine, "that some truths are
indubitable, i. e., capable of being established dialectically, and
not subject to correction by experience." 45 All of these types
of philosophic thought may be included in the one term intellectualism, with deduction as the common method of reasoning.
Their chief concern is principles, not facts, and they regard theories as ends in themselves. Their by-products are formalism and
dogmatism. Against this whole intellectualistic school there has
been a well marked revolt within recent years. There has been
a revival of positivism, relativism and empiricism. The most significant, however, of the anti-intellectualistic groups are the pragmatists and the Bergsonian intuitionists. These groups discredit
"the human intellect as an absolute truth teller and conceive it
as a fashioner of fictions, symbols, or conventions . . . or they
concede to it only a limited scope as a function of knowledge."4 6
" Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, x65.
"Article on Philosophy by Professor Frank Thilly in International Year
Book (1914) 553.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

776

Pragmatism is concerned with the workability of theories and
institutions. Professor James, one of the chief exponents of
pragmatism, thus described the attitude of the pragmatist:
"A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once and for all
upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He
turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards
power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as 7against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of
finality in truth."

4

Like pragmatism, the philosophy of Bergson is a method
rather than a system, and like pragmatism again itrefuses to
recognize the intellect as the sole or last source of knowledge.
The basis of Bergson's philosophy is his method of intuition.
"Philosophising," he says, "just consists in placing one's self, by
an effort of intuition, in the interior of concrete reality." 48
Bergson contends that knowledge gained by sensation is profounder than intellectual knowledge, 49 and he denies the validity
of logic, on which the intellectualists placed so much confidence. 0 Under the new philosophic trend facts are assuming an
importance greater than that occupied by theories, and the reasoning is inductive rather than deductive. A closer connection
between philosophy and sociology is developing. Bergson says:
"The philosophy of the future must break through the mathematical categories and take account of the sciences of biology,
psychology and sociology." r1 A recent volume by the late Professor Sidgwick, of Cambridge University, is largely devoted to
the relation of philosophy and sociology. " Two years' attendance at the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy convinced the present writer that the teachers of philosophy in this
Pragmatism, 5.
"Stewart, Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, 5.

4"James,

"James, Pluralistic Universe,

252.

"Ibid. 243.

"Stewart, Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, 4.
"Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations.
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country are more concerned with problems of sociology than with

those of metaphysics. The very term "social philosophy" indicates a new phase of philosophic thought.
Moral philosophy, or ethics, as it is now generally named,

is likewise experiencing an influx of revolutionary ideas. It is
now confidently asserted, contrary to the usual view, that there
are no definite absolute rights, that there can be no standard rules
of conduct, and that no absolutely valid rules of justice can be

formulated. 5 3 Interest is now focused on social justice, and this
idea recently became politically important.
Theology is famous for its conservatism. At the present
time, however, the development of new ideas and attitudes is
clearly discernible. Doctrines of long standing are being abrogated, and doctrines generally are receiving less attention than
formerly. Sermons, like judicial 6pinions, now contain discussions of practical problems to the proportionate exclusion of doc-

trinal exposition. A professor in a Philadelphia theological seminary is said to have described the situation picturesquely as follows: "Nowadays, instead of giving a message of salvation, the
minister is expected to preach on civic movements, the police
force and politics." " Churches are now much concerned with
the problem of practical achievement, and social service is really
the order of the day in theological circles. There is also a movement for church consolidation, which has been consummated in
several instances. Church unity has now become a familiar
Willoughby, Social Justice, 24-28. On page 26 Professor Willoughby
says: "In demonstrating the impossibility of framing absolute rules of justice, the necessity will be emphasized of bringing each of our acts to the bar
of reason, and of determining in each case, not simply its formal accordance
or non-accordance with some previously accepted rule of conduct, but whether,
as a matter of fact, both the ethical motive which prompts its performance is
a proper one, and its ultimate as well as proximate results will be such as
will tend to advance the realization of the highest good which our reason has
been able to suggest. With no thumb rules to guide us, we will be thus
taught that what is right and what is wrong for us as members of a society
can be determined only after we have ascertained all the circumstances which
have led to a given state of affairs, as well as the conditions by which a given
line of conduct is to be influenced in the future. This will mean that at least
a certain amount of study of actual social conditions is imperative upon every
one, and especially upon those who would seek to teach or guide others."
"'News item.
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theme, and plans have been made for a world conference on this
subject. Modem theology is becoming pragmatic and social.
The economics of the nineteenth century was more or less
regarded as an exact science 55 and its methods were largely deductive. Individualism, with its accompanying corollaries of the
private ownership of property, the freedom of contract and industrial competition, was the basic economic doctrine, and the
prevailing policy was laissez faire. In the economics of today
there is a great change both in attitude and method. In attitude
it has become highly socialized, social economics being now an
accepted phrase, and in method it has become experimental. As
regards property, the idea is now gaining ground that private
property is a social trust.5 6 The theoretical freedom of contract
is yielding to an appreciation of the actual fact that persons are
frequently not free to contract as they please, because of the
pressure of economic needs. In place of competition co6peration is now the keynote of industrial endeavor. 57 Consistent
with these tendenciis is the substitution of regulation in place of
the principle of laissez faire. Economists are now insisting that
the use of private property be regulated for the public benefit.
In the philanthropic side of economics we see the supplanting of
"charity" by "social service." 58
Mathematics and the allied sciences, physics and chemistry,
are fast losing their reputations for exactitude. Apparently they
are now no more exact than the law is certain. The axiom now
seems to occupy about the same position with regard to selfevident truth as does Coke's famous maxim that the "known
certainty of the law is the safety of all." " The "dogma of the
.indestructible and indivisible atom" 60 no longer holds sway. The
Roscoe Pound in note, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 734.
Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, 88.
Ibid. 9I.
5 See Farnam, Economic Utilization of History, i9o.
5 "Physics has learnt to regret accepting such seemingly self-evident
propositions as that a thing cannot act where it is not, and modern matheT

matics has learned that such seemingly self-evident assertions as that the

whole is greater than a part, or Euclid's parallel postulate are not necessarily true." M. Cohen, Place of Logic in Law, 29 Har. L. Rev. 622, 631.
' Millikan, Radiation and Atomic Structure, 45 Science (N. S.) 321.
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atom is now regarded as having a very intricate structure, one of
the widely accepted theories, the "planetary," being that it consists of a nucleus with several rings of moons around it. Experiments with radium have upset the belief that stability is the essential characteristic of an element.6 1 An editor of the Independent,
after the last meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, thus facetiously describes the position of
the physicists:
"They are not only robbing the chemist of his atom, but they
are upsetting the fundamental principles of their own science with
reckless disregard of the consequences. They show no more reverence for Newton than they do for Dalton. Even Euclid is not safe
from their inconoclastic hands. The whole is no longer equal to
the sum of its parts. An atom may weigh less than its components. Mass is made dependent upon motion. Action does not always vary inversely as the square of the distance. Time is purely
relative. Length depends upon velocity. The second law of thermodynamics is declared unconstitutional. Action and reaction may
be neither equal nor opposite. Energy does not flow out continuously but is emitted in atoms. Such are some of the subversive
heresies now being openly profest and preached even in orthodox
circles." 62
Medicine is also assuming a new complexion. In method it
has now become avowedly experimental, and with this change
have come more effective results. Further, the viewpoint of the
profession has been measurably enlarged. Physicians are no
longer concerned solely with the symptoms of the individual
patient, but are studying the causes of disease and are taking steps
to eradicate them. The extent to which this has been carried is
evidenced by the establishment of chairs of preventive medicine
in some of our medical schools. The necessary equipment of the
medical practitioner has been greatly increased in recent years.
He must now be somewhat of a psychologist and sociologist as
well as a physician. In addition to this, he is now coiiperating,
as never before, with the members of other professions. Psychological laboratories in connection with law courts afford oppor"Ramsay, Ancient and Modern Views Regarding the Chemical Elements,
Report of Smithsonian Institution, 1911, p. 183.
" Editorial in the Independent, Jan. 29, 1917.
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tunity for the physician to advise judges and prosecutors as to the
proper treatment to be accorded feeble-minded and insane persons
charged with crime. In connection with the whole difficult problem of dealing with mentally diseased and defective offenders
members of the medical and legal professions are now working
together. An interesting book 63 on the connection of medicine
with education and social work appeared a few years ago. The
author states the effect of such 'relation on medicine as follows:
"No one can have followed the history of the last ten years
in medicine, education, and social work and noted the increasing
evidence of their interpenetration and closer co-operation without
discerning:
(a) The rapid growth of public medicine, whose method is
educational, preventive, and sociological;
(b) The consequent restriction of the sphere of the 'private
doctor.' ""4

Psychology is probably undergoing the greatest change of
all the sciences. Thirty years ago a distinguished scholar defined
psychology as the "science of the human soul." 05 The psychologists of that time, particularly in this country, were mostly
clergymen, and their principal methods were self-observation and
the derivation of psychic phenomena from metaphysical
hypotheses. 60 The connection between metaphysics and psychology was for a long time very close. One of the chief concerns of the earlier psychologists was the metaphysical problem
of whether or not the will is free. The older psychology was
theoretical and was concerned with the mental phenomena of the
individual alone.
Very little of the foregoing description applies to the advanced psychology of today. The association with theology and
metaphysics has been broken, and a new one has been formed
with physiology and biology. The problem of the freedom of
the will is now disregarded by psychologists, and is left for the
few remaining metaphysicists. A recent German writer says
the "new psychology differs from the old in its spirit: it is not
metaphysical; in its end: it studies only phenomena; in its proCabot, Social Service and the Art of Healing.
"P. III.

"Porter, The Human Intellect.
- Hall, Founders of Modem Psychology,

319.
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cedure: it borrows as much as possible from the biological sciences." o7 The establishing of the connection between mental
and nervous states has changed psychology from a speculative
to an experimental science, and it is along this line that there has
been a rapid development in recent years. Closely connected with
this has been the change in method from'self observation to the
study of the mental reactions of others, for which study many
well equipped laboratories have been established. Equally significant is the development of social psychology 68 due to a realization of the facts that the "individual adult man, as known to us
by experience, is what he is in consequence of having grown up
in social relations," 69 and that mental phenomena result from
the co6peration of several individuals. 70 Attention is now given
to the study of the mental phenomena of a group, mob psychology
for instance, as well as to the study of the mind of the individual
as influenced by his social environment. Finally there must be
noted the striking utilitarian trend of psychology within the last
few years. Psychological studies are now applied in many practical fields, notably in medicine, law, education and business,"
and experimental research in various lines of applied psychology
has been started. In contrast to the older psychology, which was
speculative, subjective, individual and theoretical, the new psychology may accurately be described as experimental, objective,
social and utilitarian.
The fine arts, as well as the sciences, are now experiencing
radical innovations. Within the past few years interest has been
aroused by exhibitions of painting and sculpture which represent
a marked departure from traditional standards. Lack of symmetry and a suggesting rather than a depicting of the subject,
"Ribot, German Philosophy of Today, Introd. 5.
"Psychology has reflected the collectivistic tendency generally noticeable in late nineteenth-century thought." Baldwin, History of Psychology,
Vol. 2, 104. "1 agree with the late Professor Croom Robertson in holding
that the non-recognition of the social factor in psychology is a grave defect
in the method of the older English psychologists." Sidgwick, PhilosophyIts Scope and Relations, i58. See McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, and Ross, Social Psychology.
' Sidgwick, Philosophy-Its Scope and Relations, i59.
" Mfinsterberg, Psychology-General and Applied, 2.
" See, for example, Gilbreth, The Psychology of Management; Mfinsterberg, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency; Scott, Psychology of Advertising.
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combined in the case of painting with unusual color combinations, seem to characterize this new art. Its followers see in it
an emancipation from the deadening restrictions of standardized
rules, while its critics can see nothing but bad drawing and composition and execrable taste in the use of colors. This new tendency in art is manifested in the work of several groups-the
cubists, the post-impressionistS and the futurists. They differ
among themselves as to subject and manner of treatment, but
they are one in their protest against orthodox methods.
In the closely allied field of architecture there is evidence of
a similar breaking away from accepted forms. Refusals to follow
classical, Gothic and colonial models are now not infrequent in
this country, and the development of a new style is discernible.
New materials are being employed, and the environment is considered to a greater extent than formerly in the effort to secure
a better effect. Most significant of all is the attention that is
now given to adapting the building to the purpose for which it
is intended. This is particularly noticeable in the case of public
buildings, for which the wasteful dome and rotunda are now no
longer regarded as essential.
Literature is now undergoing an internal revolution very
similar to that observed in the pictorial arts. "Free verse" is
winning a recognition for itself both in this country and abroad,
and at the same time is bringing down upon itself the wrathful
ire of the conservative critics. This form of literary expression in
appearance somewhat resembles ordinary poetry, but has neither
rhyme or meter, the latter of which has almost universally been
regarded as the sine qua non of poetic construction. The new
verse is based on rhythmical cadence, although the rhythm is
more subtle than that to which we are accustomed. There are
several groups of free verse writers, the realists, the fantasists
and the futurists, but they differ more in subject than in method,
and they all have as their motto "the abandonment of existing
forms." A recent writer says that "the coldness of their reception is due in part to the inveterate traditionalism of the human
race." 72
"Independent, Oct. i6, i916.
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Music is also displaying an anti-traditionalistic tendency.
Richard Strauss, acclaimed by many as the greatest living composer, has employed new forms of musical expression and on
occasions has shocked the conventionally minded with his frank
realism. Debussy is also a realist. He contends that melody is
incapable of expressing completely the ranges of sentiment and
emotion. The impressionists are composing musical novelties,
which are meeting with rather consistent lack of appreciation.
There are also futurists in music, as well as in painting, sculpture
and poetry, who are experimenting with new forms. Professor
Clarke, of the University of Pennsylvania, in a lecture delivered
a year ago, said of modernism in music: "It has enlarged the
boundaries and swept away some of the pedantries that hampered music."
From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the
arts and sciences which have been considered are now undergoing
a definite evolution, in some instances amounting to revolution,
and that there is a marked similarity in the character of the
changes which are occurring in each field. The instances given
are too numerous, and the fields are too closely interrelated, to
justify the conclusion that such similarity is merely a coincidence.
On the contrary, the evidence seems sufficient to establish that a
general movement is now taking place, and that its trend is away
from traditional standards, doctrines and rules.
In the case of the sciences the movement is displaying three
distinct qualities. It is empirical, pragmatic and social. Principles are now developed from observation and experiment, they
are being judged by their workability, and the interests now being
increasingly served are those of society. This last quality is
evidenced by the new nomenclature-social legislation, sociological jurisprudence, social philosophy, social economics, social
service, social justice and social psychology.
Edwin R. Keedy.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
" University of Pennsylvania Public Lectures, I915-I916, 454, 458.

